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Freedman: Earl Washington's Ordeal

EARL WASHINGTON'S ORDEAL
EricM. Freednan'

By way of preface to this Symposium, I offer an account of the
ordeal of Earl Washington, who-having come within days of
execution-was released from prison on February 12, 2001, after DNA
evidence of his innocence finally proved conclusive to the Virginia
authorities.' I do so for two reasons.

First, I believe, both as a member of his legal team and a scholar,
that history deserves an accurate account of the events.2 Second, more

broadly, I believe that the case exemplifies many of the phenomena that
contribute to the injustice of the death penalty in America today," and
* Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law (LAWEMF hofstr.edu. BA.
1975, Yale University; M.A. 1977, Victoria University of \Vellington (New Zealand); J.D. 1979.

Yale University. Professor Freedman served as one of Earl Washington's legal counsel.
During the long years of Mr. Washington's ordeal, many professionals, lawyers, and nonlawyers generously donated their resources. These included Dr. David Bing, Professor Edw.ard J.
Bronson, Dr. Henry Ehrlich, Dr. John N. Follansbee, Martha Geer, Esq.. Peter C. Huber. Esq.,
Dr. Henry C. Lee, Professor Ruth Luckasson. Jonathan D. Sasser, Esq., Dr. T. Richard Saunders,
and Jay Topkis, Esq.
The primary members of the legal team, all of whom also served pro bona. were attomeys

Robert T. Hall, Peter Neufeld, Barry C. Scheck, Bany A. Weinstein. Gerald T. Zerkin. and
mitigation specialist Marie M. Deans. These individuals have kindly reviewed a draft of this Article
and provided helpful input, although of course I retain responsibility for the final produet.
At one point or another, each of the people named in the previous tvwo paragraphs Inot to
mention Mr.Washington's fellow death row inmate Joseph Giarratano, see infra notes 69-70 and
accompanying text) was critical to saving Mr. Washington's life. Thus, there was a real need for the
estimated $10 million worth of volunteer resources that were expended during his struggle. See Jim
Dwyer, Testing the Rush to Death Row, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.). Sept. 7,2000, at 20.
This work is copyrighted by the Author, who retains all rights thereto. Permission is
hereby granted to nonprofit institutions to reproduce this work for classroom use, pro ided that
credit is given on each copy to the Author and the Hofstra Law Review.
1. See Tim McGlone, FormerDeath-Row Inmate Released into Spotlight. VIRGI i 4-P1LOT
(Norfolk), Feb. 13, 2001, at Al.
2. Accordingly, all of the documents cited in this Article are available on request from the
Barbara and Maurice A. Deane Law Library at the Hofstra University School of Law.
3. A recent comprehensive summary of these is to be found in Part II of the scholarly amicus
brief submitted on behalf of Professor Anthony G. Amsterdam of New York University School of
Law and other capital punishment experts (including myself) on November 17, 2000. in People r.
Harrisin the New York Court of Appeals. See Brief of Amici Curiae, People v. Harris IN.Y. Dc.
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that its story therefore offers an appropriate framework within which to
view the Symposium contributions that follow.
I.

THE ORDEAL

On June 4, 1982, Rebecca Lynn Williams, returning home at
noontime with her two young children to her apartment in the town of
Culpeper, Virginia, was raped and stabbed. She could do no more than
identify her assailant as a black man acting alone, and died a few hours
later.4
At trial, the officer who responded to the call testified, "I asked her
if she knew who her attacker was. She replied, no. I asked her then if the
attacker was black or white and she replied, black. I then asked her if
there was more than one and she replied, no."'
Similarly, Ms.Williams' husband testified, "I asked her, you know,
who did it, and the
only thing she replied to me was, a black man, and
6'

that was about it.

Almost a year later, on May 21, 1983, Earl Washington, "a black
man, aged 22 at the time, with a general I.Q. in the range of 69, that of a
child in the 10.3 year age group, 7 was arrested on unrelated charges by
the police in Warrenton, in Fauquier County, Virginia.
Those charges arose as follows. After Mr. Washington had spent a
number of hours drinking heavily with family members, a dispute arose.
Mr. Washington broke into a nearby house for the purpose of stealing a
pistol that he knew to be there, and was surprised by the householder,
Mrs. Hazel Weeks. He hit her over the head with a chair, and returned to
the gathering. As he entered the house with the gun at his side, it
accidentally discharged, hitting his brother, Robert, in the foot. Mr.
Washington fled into the woods, where the police found him a few hours
later."

19, 2000) (No. 1399) [hereinafter Harris Brief], to be reprinted in 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE (forthcoming 2002). Their relationship to Mr. Washington's experience has been cogently
summarized in Margaret Edds, Virginia's Leaky System of Capital Punishment Needs to be
Plugged,VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk), Jan. 28, 2001, at J5.
4. See Washington v. Murray, 952 F.2d 1472, 1475 (4th Cir. 1991) [hereinafter
Washington 1].
5. 5 Joint Appendix at 1462, Washington v. Murray, 952 F.2d 1472 (4th Cir. 1991) (No.
89-4013) [hereinafter Joint Appendix] (Trial Testimony of Kenneth H. Buraker).
6. 5 Joint Appendix, supra note 5, at 1464 [hereinafter Williams Testimony] (Trial
Testimony of Clifford Williams).
7. Washington 1, 952 F.2d at 1475.
8. See Earl Washington, Jr.: An Innocent Man, Petition for Executive Pardon at 4 (Dec. 20,
1993) [hereinafter 1993 Pardon Petition].
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While in police custody, Mr. Washington "confessed" to five

different crimes. In four of the cases, the "confession" proved to be so
inconsistent with the crime it purported to describe that it was simply
rejected by the Commonwealth as the unreliable product of Mr.
Washington's acquiescence to the officers 9 In the fifth case-which
resulted in the capital murder conviction and sentence-the statement
had to be reshaped through four rehearsal sessions before reaching a
form the authorities considered usable.0t

Confession #1: The questioning began on the morning of May 21,
1993 when law enforcement officers of Fauquier County secured from
Mr. Washington a waiver of his Miranda rights." They began by
discussing the Weeks case and ultimately obtained a "confession."
According to a vivid account contained in this document, Mr.
Washington had attempted to rape Mrs. Weeks.1 But Mrs. Weeks
testified to the contrary at the preliminary

hearing" and the

Commonwealth dropped the charge of attempted rape."'
5 Thereafter, Mr.

Washington pleaded guilty to statutory burglary'

and malicious

wounding, 6 and was sentenced to consecutive fifteen-year prison
terms.'7 But on the morning of May 21, 1983, all of this lay in the future.
Confession #2: Having obtained Mr. Washington's "confession" to
the Weeks crime, the police turned the conversation to an attempted rape
that had occurred on Waterloo Road.' Mr. Washington confessed to this

9. See infra text accompanying notes 18-25.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 2644.
11. See I Joint Appendix, supra note 5,at 116-17 [hereinafter Washington IntervievI JMay
21-23, 1983 Interview of Earl Washington, Jr.).
12. See Washington Interview, supra note 11, at 125; Statement by Earl Washington, Jr. at
1-2 (May 21, 1983), reprintedin Earl Washington, Jr.:An Innocent Man, Exhibits and Apprandices
to Petition for Executive Pardon at Exhibit 11 (Dec. 20. 1993) [hereinafter Exhibits to 1993 Pardon
Petition].
13. See Preliminary Hearing Transcript at 6-7, Commonwealth v. Washington (Va. Cir. CL
June 23, 1983) (Felony Nos. 5062, 5063) [hereinafter Prelim. Hr'g Tr.] (Testimony of Hazel
Weeks), reprintedin Exhibits to 1993 Pardon Petition, supranote 12,at Exhibit 7.
14. See Prelim. Hr'g Tr., supranote 13, at 25 (Statement of Prosecutor).
15. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-89 (lichie 1996).
16. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-51 (Michie 1996).
17. See Order at 2, Commonwealth v. Vashington. Felony Nos. 5052,5063 (Va. Cir. CL Mak
1, 1984), reprintedin Exhibits to 1993 Pardon Petition, supranote 12, at Exhibit 3.
18. See Interview of Earl Washington at I (May 23, 1933) [hereinafter Sulp!cnicntal
Washington Interview], reprintedin Exhibits to 1993 Pardon Petition, supranote 12. at Evhibit I1.
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too, but the charge was dismissed.' 9 Mr. Washington's
"confession" was
20
inconsistent with important facts in that case.
Confession #3: Next, the police obtained Mr. Washington's
"confession" to a breaking and entering on Winchester Street." He was
never charged with this crime. The victim saw him in a line-up and
stated that he was not the assailant.2
Confession #4: Mr. Washington then "confessed" to the rape of
another woman. 23 He was charged with this crime, but the charge was
dismissed by the Commonwealth.' The victim's description of the
attacker was inconsistent with Mr. Washington and she had previously
identified someone else as the assailant.2
Confession #5: At this point in the interrogation, according to
handwritten police notes given to-but never used by-counsel who
represented Mr. Washington in his capital case,
Because I felt that he was still hiding something, being nervous, and

due to the nature of his crimes that he was already charged with and
would be charged with, we decided to ask him about the murder which

occurred in Culpeper in 1982.
..Earl didn't look at us, but was still very nervous. Asked Earl if

he knew anything about it. Earl sat there and didn't reply just as he did
in the other cases prior to admitting them. At this time I asked Earl"EARL DID YOU KILL THAT GIRL IN CULPEPER?" Earl sat there
silent for about five seconds and then shook his head yes and started
16
crying.

The entire interrogation that followed consisted of the officers
asking Mr. Washington a series of leading questions about the crime and

19. See Order at 1, Commonwealth v. Washington, Felony Nos. 5032,5061 (Va. Cir. Ct. May
3, 1984), reprintedin Exhibits to 1993 Pardon Petition, supra note 12, at Exhibit 20.
20. Compare Supplemental Washington Interview, supra note 18, at i-la, with Warrenton
Police Department, Preliminary Investigation Report at 1-3 (Case No. 02148-82) (Nov. 12, 1982),
both reprintedin Exhibits to 1993 Pardon Petition, supra note 12, at Exhibit 11.
21. See Supplemental Washington Interview, supra note 18, at la-2, reprinted in Exhibits to
1993 Pardon Petition, supranote 12, at Exhibit 11.
22. See 1993 Pardon Petition, supra note 8, at 6.
23. See Washington Interview, supra note 1I, at 3-4, reprinted in I Joint Appendix, supra
note 5, at 118-19.
24. See Order, Commonwealth v. Washington, Felony Nos. 5033, 5034 (Va. Cir. Ct. May 1,
1984), reprintedin Exhibits to 1993 Pardon Petition, supra note 12, at Exhibit 10.
25. See Warrenton Police Department, Supplementary Investigation Report at 2 (Case No.
1286-83) (May 2, 1983), reprintedin Exhibits to 1993 Pardon Petition, supra note 12, at Exhibit 1I;
see also Affidavit of Commonwealth's Attorney Jonathan S. Lynn paras. 6-8 (Dec. 7, 1993),
reprintedin Exhibits to 1993 Pardon Petition, supra note 12, at Exhibit 9.
26. Washington Interview, supranote 11, at 120.
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obtaining affirmative responses.- This process eventually ceased, as the
police notes frankly acknowledge, because the police had exhausted
their store of information about the crime. Thus, for example, the
Fauquier County officers did not know that Ms. Williams had been
raped,2' and Mr. Washington did not supply any such information.
At this point, the Fauquier police called the Culpeper police and
invited them to participate in the questioning." The following morning,
May 22, 1983, Mr. Washington first had another session with the
Fauquier authorities at which, according to the officers' notes, "[h]e
went through the story (as on 05/21/83) again."'" Then two officers from
Culpeper, following oral Miranda warnings, began to interrogate Mr.
Washington. No contemporaneous records of this second interrogation
have ever been produced, and it was apparently not recorded.
However, the interrogating officer later described the session in
court."3 He testified that Mr. Washington initially wrongly identified Ms.
Williams as having been black, and only corrected the statement on
being re-asked the question." This pattern was common throughout the
interrogation: "I asked him to describe this woman. He had problems
with describing." 5
Thus, in addition to not knowing the race of Ms. Williams, when
asked non-leading questions:
-He had described the victim as "short."' She was 5'8" tall."
-He had said that
he stabbed the victim "once or twice."' 3 She had
39
times.
38
stabbed
been

27. For example, the interrogating officer testified that, as soon as Mr. Washington stoplpd
crying, 'I told him, to clarify things, I told him, rm talking about the girl that was found stablk-d
laying naked outside the apartment or townhouse in Culpeper. I asked him if that's the one and he

said, yes." 5 Joint Appendix, supra note 5, at 1535 [hereinafter Schrum Testimony] (Trial
Testimony of Terry Schrum).
28. See Washington Interview, supranote 11. at 121.

29. See Schrum Testimony, supranote 27, at 1536.
30. See id. at 1537.
31. Washington Interview, supranote 11, at 127.
32. See 5 Joint Appendix, supra note 5, at 1558-59 (hereinafter Wilmore Testimony] (Trial
Testimony of Reese Wilmore).
33. See id.at 1559-62.
34. See id. at 1560.
35. Id.; see also Washington 1, 952 F.2d at 1478 n.5.
36. See Washington Interview, supranote 11, at 121.

37. See 5 Joint Appendix, supra note 5, at 1479 [hereinafter Beyer Testimony] 4Trial
Testimony of Dr. James C. Beyer).
38. 4 Joint Appendix, supra note 5, at 1030 [hereinafter Second Washington Statement] IMay
22, 1983 Statement of Earl Washington, Jr.).
39. See Beyer Testimony, supranote 37, at 1474.
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4
-He had said he saw no one else
41 in the apartment. " Two of the
present.
were
children
victim's young
After approximately an hour of review of the facts, according to the
police testimony, the officers informed Mr. Washington that they would
ask him the same questions once more, this time reducing the
conversation to writing. They did so, and the resulting document was
admitted at trial as his "confession. '2
During the afternoon of May 22, 1983, while Mr. Washington's
statement of that day was being typed up for his signature, officers drove
him to numerous apartment buildings in Culpeper in an effort to get him
to identify the scene of the crime. Three times they drove into the
apartment complex where the crime had actually occurred. On the third
occasion, when asked to point out the scene of the crime, Mr.
Washington "pointed to an apartment on the exact opposite end from
where the Williams girl was killed. At that time I pointed to the
Williams apartment and asked him directly, is that the one?" This
question obtained an affirmative response. 4'
Similarly, the police officers had Mr. Washington identify as his
own a shirt of unknown provenance that was found at the apartment and
given to them by family members six weeks after the crime.4
During the guilt phase of the trial, the only evidence offered by the
prosecution to link Mr. Washington to the crime consisted of his
statements (including his identification of the shirt).
Defense counsel failed to obtain or offer available evidence that:
-The Commonwealth's own serologic analysis of the seminal
fluid found on the blanket where the crime took place showed that it
could not have come from Mr. Washington.46

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See Second Washington Statement, supranote 38, at 1031.
See 5 Joint Appendix, supranote 5, at 1455-56 (Trial Testimony of Officer JL. Jackson).
See Wilmore Testimony, supra note 32, at 1574-84.
Id. at 1588.
See Washington 1, 952 F.2d at 1478.
See id. at 1477-78.
Compare BUREAU OF FORENSIC SCIENCE, COMMONWEALTH OF VA., AMENDED COPY OF
CERTIFICATE OF ANALYSIS (Aug. 26, 1983) [hereinafter AUG. 26 CERTIFICATE], with BUREAU OF
FORENSIC SCIENCE, COMMONWEALTH OF VA., CERTIFICATE OF ANALYSIS (Aug. 12, 1983)
[hereinafter AUG. 12 CERTIFICATE], both reprintedin Exhibits to 1993 Pardon Petition, supra note
12, at Exhibit 6 (showing that Earl Washington's blood and secretion type is 0, while the semen
stains on a blue blanket found on the victim's bed were type A); see also Washington 1, 952 F.2d at
1476; 8 Joint Appendix, supra note 5, at 2281, 2290-94 (Evidentiary Hearing Testimony of David
A. Stoney and John C. Bennett).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol29/iss4/4

6

Freedman: Earl Washington's Ordeal
20011

EARL IVASHINGTON'S ORDEL

-According to the same serological methodology the semen type
was consistent with the Commonwealth's first suspect, James
Pendleton.47
-The hairs found in the pocket of the shirt found at the crime
scene were consistent in part with that suspect's facial hair, but were

not compared to Mr. Washington's hairs. When the state crime
laboratory pointed out this inconsistency to the Culpeper police and

requested
additional Washington hairs for comparison, the police
49
refused.

Defense counsel also failed to show that Mr. Washington was

wholly incapable of understanding Miranda warnings, "' or that the
process of suggestion by which the police officers had obtained the
"confession" dovetailed precisely with his adaptive strategy for living in
the normal world, which consisted of attempting to please his

interlocutors by telling them what they wanted to hear." Instead, defense
counsel put Mr. Washington on the stand, perhaps intending that this

mentally challenged individual-who cannot name the colors of the
American flag or state the function of a thermometer" 2 -testify that,
although he had signed the confession, its contents were false. In any

event, what he did testify was that he had never made the confession."
Defense counsel then made a closing argument which simply asked

the jury to give Mr. Washington his day in court, without, however,
discussing one iota of the evidence the jury had heard 4
47. See AUG. 26 CERTIFICATE, supra note 46, at 8 (noting that James Pendleton's blood typlr
is A); see also Washington , 952 F.2d at 1478 n.6. In 2000, it was revealed that DNA anal)sis of
the semen stain showed it to be inconsistent with that of Mr. Pendleton and consistent with an
individual incarcerated in Virginia for a sex crime. See Gov. James S. Gilmore, I1H,Absolute Pardon
of Earl Washington 2 (Oct. 2, 2000); Editorial, State Being Mun About 19S2 Rape.3trder

ViRGuItNi-PILoT (Norfolk), June 20, 2001, at BIO; Frank Green, No One Charged in Killing,
RICHMONDiimES-DISPATCH, June 16,2001, at BI; McGlone, supra note 1.
48. See AUG. 26 CErTnCATIZ supra note 46, at 8-9; see also Washington 1, 952 F.2d at
1478.
49. See Washington 1,952 F.2d at 1478; AUG. 12 CERTIFICATE, supra note 46.
50. See I Joint Appendix, supra note 5, at 154 [hereinafter Saunders Declaration] (Aug. 25,
1985 Declaration of Richard T. Saunders, Ph.D.).
51. See Ruth Luckasson, Evaluation of Earl Washington at 7-8 (Dec. 17, 1993), repnntcd in
Exhibits to 1993 Pardon Petition, supra note 12, at Exhibit 1. Professor Luckasson. one of the
country's leading experts on mental retardation, volunteered her services to examine Mr.
Washington. See Washington , 952 F.2d at 1481; see also supra note * (listing the other
professionals who volunteered to help save Earl Washington's life).
52. See Saunders Declaration, supranote 50, at 150.
53. See 5 Joint Appendix, supra note 5, at 1608-09, 1616-18 (Trial Testimon of Earl
Washington, Jr.).
54. See 6 Joint Appendix, supra note 5, at 1977-79 [hereinafter Defense Counsel's Closngl
(Closing Statement of Defense Counsel); see also Washington L 952 F.2d at 1481.
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Not surprisingly, Mr. Washington was convicted.
At the punishment phase, the Commonwealth relied solely on the
aggravating circumstance that the defendant's "conduct in committing
the offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman."" It
called as a witness, without objection by defense counsel, Helen T.
Richards, the victim's mother. 6 The exclusive subject of her testimony
was the traumatic psychological effect of the murder upon two of the
victim's young children. 7 After describing this, and the special
psychiatric care that the two were receiving, Mrs. Richards continued:
[T]hey have a telephone that is just used for talking to their mama in
heaven and this is the way they talk about their problems. They sit
down on the phone and they take turns talking to mama in heaven, to
let her know how things are going, especially if they're very, very
upset or something has upset them, and they sit down... it's a
little.., it's just a regular telephone, a little black phone, and they sit
down and they dial and they talk to their mama. It's not an easy thing
to work with children that are emotionally disturbed like this. They're
beautiful children. 8
Defense counsel's jury argument at the punishment phase took up
in its entirety twenty-seven lines in the record.5 ' After the prosecutor had
graphically and repeatedly described the thirty-eight stab wounds to
fourteen vital organs and the "pool of blood" in which the victim lay,wO
defense counsel advised the jury that "this is Earl Washington's day in
Court and you must do him justice. ' ' 61He gave no reason why the jury

55. 6 Joint Appendix, supra note 5, at 2063 (Jury Instruction No. 17, Commonwealth v.
Washington (Va. Cir. Ct. 1984) (No. 52- F(83))).
56. See 5 Joint Appendix, supra note 5, at 1648-49 [hereinafter Richards Testimony] (Trial
Testimony of Helen T. Richards).
57. See id. at 1645-49.
58. Id. at 1648-49. If defense counsel had objected to this argument, it probably would have
been disallowed under the Eighth Amendment as then interpreted. See Booth v,Maryland, 482 U.S.
496, 500-03 (1987) (holding that a victim impact statement describing the emotional impact of the
crime on family members was irrelevant to a capital sentencing decision and risked imposition of
the death penalty "in an arbitrary and capricious manner," thus violating the Eighth Amendment);
Rushing v. Butler, 868 F.2d 800, 803 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that a victim impact statement
introduced during the sentencing phase "created the constitutionally impermissible risk" that
defendant was sentenced to death primarily "on the basis of emotionally charged testimony from the
victim's family"). But defense counsel made no objection. See Richards Testimony, supra note 56,
at 1649. Booth was subsequently overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
59. See Defense Counsel's Closing, supra note 54, at 1679-80.
60. See 5 Joint Appendix, supra note 5, at 1675-78 (Closing Statement of Prosecutor John C.
Bennett).
61. Defense Counsel's Closing, supranote 54, at 1679.
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should not impose the death penalty. As to the factors the jury should
consider, he submitted:
there is really, not really, in the course of human experience, any
particular standard that governs us all with respect to punishment, so
each of you, each of you must search within yourself to consider the
crime and consider the gentleman whom you have found to be its
perpetrator and look at him and look at the crime and determine what
punishment is just for him. His life is in your hands."e
Not surprisingly, the jury sentenced Mr. Washington to death.
The direct appeal was handled by the trial lawyer. Not surprisingly,
it was summarily denied.
On the reasonable assumption that certiorari would not be granted
at this stage, the next step would be the filing of a state habeas corpus
petition, which, among other things, was and is a statutory prerequisite
to the filing of a federal habeas corpus petition. Virginia, however, did
not provide for the appointment of counsel at this phase,' and the trial
lawyer's motion for that relief was denied.6

62. Id.at 1679-80.
63. See Washington v. Commonwealth, 323 S.E.2d 577, 5S9 (Va. 1984), cert. denied. 471

U.S. 1111 (1985). In fairness to trial counsel, this result was probably independent of the merits of
his presentation. Since 1976, the Virginia Supreme Court has granted relief on direct appal in a
capital case only twelve times, the majority of which occurred after Earl Washington's appeal. See
Povell v. Commonwealth, 544 S.E.2d 679, 699 (Va. 2001) (vacating capital consicion and
remanding case for retrial on first degree murder charges only); Yarbrough v. Cononvath. 519
S.E.2d 602, 617 (Va. 1999) (remanding for resentencing); Lilly v. Commonwealth. 523 S.E.2d 203,
210 (Va. 1999) (reversing capital conviction); Atkins v. Commonwealth, 510 S.E.2d 445. 457 tVa.
1999) (remanding for resentencing based on jury verdict form error); Mickens v. Commonwealth.
457 S.E.2d 9, 10 (Va. 1995) (remanding for resentencing); Rogers v. Commonwealth. 410 S.E.2d
621, 629 (Va. 1991) (reversing capital conviction); Cheng v. Commonwealth, 393 S.E.2d 599,
608-09 (Va. 1990) (reversing capital conviction); Frye v. Commonwealth, 345 S. -d 267, 288 (Va.
1986) (vacating death sentence and remanding for resentencing); Patterson v. Commanoealth, 283
S.E.2d 212, 219 (Va. 1981) (commuting death sentence to life imprisonment); Justus v.
Commonvealth, 266 S.E.2d 87, 93 (Va. 1980) (reversing capital conviction and awarding a new
trial), appeal after remanud at 283 S.E.2d 905, 913 (Va. 1981) (affirming capital conviction and
death sentence after retrial); Martin v. Commonwealth, 271 S.E.2d 123, 131 IVa. 1980) (reversing
capital conviction); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 255 S.E.2d 525. 532 (Va. 1979) (reversing capital
conviction). In fact, the rate at which the Virginia state court system upsets death cases on either
direct appeal or collateral review is only thirteen percent, by far the lowest in the country. See
JANMES
S. LmBMAN ET AL, A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES iNCPITAL C.ASES, 1973-1995 app.
at A-59, C-I, C-50 (rev. ed. 2000).
64. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
65. A narrow Supreme Court ruling upheld the constitutionality of this practice in Murray u
Giarratano,492 U.S. 1,7-8, 12 (1989).
66. See 1 Joint Appendix, supra note 5. at 114 (Felony Order, Commonwealth v. Washington,
No. 52-F(83) (Va. Cir. Ct. July 3, 1985)).
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Thus, in August, 1985, when Mr. Washington-facing an execution
date of September 567-was moved to Virginia's Death House, he had no
legal representation.' Meanwhile, his fellow prisoner Joseph Giarratano
had been attempting to bring Mr. Washington's plight to anyone who
would listen, including the local District Judge and Marie M. Deans,
director of the Virginia Coalition on Jails and Prisons. 69 Mr. Giarratano
and Ms. Deans (who had been frantically but unsuccessfully soliciting
law firms around the country to volunteer for the case) raised the matter
with Martha Geer. Ms. Geer, then a junior associate at Paul, Weiss,
Rifkind, Wharton, & Garrison of New York City, was in Virginia to
0
prepare the lawsuit that eventually became Murray v. Giarratano."
She
brought the matter to the attention of her superiors at Paul, Weiss and
Jay Topkis, a senior partner in that firm who had repeatedly arranged for
it to donate its resources to death penalty cases,7" agreed that it could
undertake to save Mr. Washington's life.
A team of lawyers from Paul, Weiss under my direction as senior
associate managed, after a virtually sleepless week, to file a 1600-page
petition for state habeas corpus, along with several applications for
ancillary reliefl One of these, an application for a stay of execution,
was granted by the circuit judge, thereby forestalling the execution nine
days before it was scheduled to take place.73
As planned, Paul, Weiss then sought volunteer lawyers to take its
place. As a result, Peter C. Huber, and then Robert T. Hall, assumed
primary responsibility for Mr. Washington's representation.74 At this
stage, Mr. Hall discovered the exculpatory semen stain evidence 7"

67. See id.
68. In the subsequent court challenge that eventuated in Giarratano, the government's
representatives explained that the sentence of the court would have been executed regardless of
whether Earl Washington had representation. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Note, Murray v.
Giarratano: A Remedy Reduced to a Meaningless Ritual, 39 Am. U. L. REv. 765, 765 n.5 (1990).
Ultimately, the Virginia legislature responded to Giarratanoby passing a law establishing that,
within thirty days after the decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia to affirm a death sentence, the
court shall appoint counsel to represent an indigent prisoner in a state habeas corpus proceeding. See
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163.7 (Michie 2000); DONALD E. WILKES, JR., STATE POSTCONVICTION
REMEDIES AND RELIEF 858-59 (1996).

69. See Moohr, supranote 68, at 765 n.5.
70. 492 U.S. 1, 3 (1989).
71. See Susan Beck, The Last Resort, AM. LAW., July/Aug. 1990, at 54, 54; Michael Orey,
Paul, Weiss: Profits and Principle,A. LAW., June 1987, at 70,73.
72. See 1Joint Appendix, supra note 5, at 69-110 (Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus).
73. See 3 Joint Appendix, supra note 5, at 714 [hereinafter Sullenberger Opinion] (Letter
Opinion of Hon. Lloyd C. Sullenberger).
74. See Sullenberger Opinion, supra note 73, at 714.
75. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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which, having been appropriately turned over by the government, lay
unappreciated in the files of the former defense counsel 6
Notwithstanding this evidence (and a great deal more) of
ineffective performance by counsel, the state habeas corpus petition
raising this and other claims was denied without a hearing." The
Virginia Supreme Court denied review.78 Mr. Hall then filed a federal
habeas corpus petition. This, too, was denied without a hearing.)
Having by this time become a law professor, I undertook the appeal
of this decision, which succeeded to the extent of a remand for an
evidentiary hearing.! On remand, Gerald T. Zerkin joined the legal
team, and the two sides presented a good deal of testimony, from the
trial attorneys and from experts, concerning the exculpatory evidence.
Eventually, the district court issued an opinion stating that defense
counsel had made a conscious decision, for tactical reasons, not to offer
the exculpatory evidence.8'
That finding was so utterly without evidentiary support that the
government did not even attempt to defend it on oral argument of the
resulting appeal, on which I again represented Mr. Washington. Rather,
the government urged the theory that a divided Fourth Circuit panel
eventually accepted: that defense counsel's performance had indeed
been ineffective, but the error was non-prejudicial in light of the
overwhelming weight of the evidence against Mr. Washington, namely
his confessions."
Since that case-specific ruling was hardly one likely to result in a
grant of certiorari, the legal system at this point had given its final
sanction to Mr. Washington's execution, which in ordinary course would
be likely to occur within a few months. During this period, a
76. See 8 Joint Appendix, supra note 5. at 2 6-47 (Affidavit of John W. Scott, Jr. ii-. 2,3,4.
7). DNA evidence did not exist at the time. Rather, as indicated in supra note 46. the evidence vas

that the blood type of the semen stain tested by the government had proved to be incernistant with
both that of Mr. Washington and that of the victim's husband, Clifford Williams.
77. See Sullenberger Opinion, supranote 73, at 720; 3 Joint Appendix. supra note 5. at 72122 (Dismissal Order).
78. See Washington 1, 952 F.2d at 1475. As with its decision on direct appeal, see supra n e

63 and accompanying text, this was in accordance with the usual practice of the Virginia Supreme
Court. Since Virginia's first modem death sentence in 1977, relief after the direct appeal slsce Jhis
been granted in no more than four capital cases, twice (including Earl Waqhington, by eccuti~e
pardon. See LtEBmAN Er AL., supranote 63, app. at A-59, C-l, C-50.
79. See 7 Joint Appendix. supra note 5, at 2160 (Memorandum Opinion of Hon. Claude- M.

Hilton); 7 Joint Appendix, supranote 5. at 2182 (Dismissal Order).
80. See WVashington 1, 952 F.2d at 1475.

81. See 8 Joint Appendix, supra note 5, at 2229-30 (Memorandum Opinion of Hon. Claude
M. Hilton); 8 Joint Appendix, supranote 5, at 2224 (Dismissal Order).

82. See Washington v. Murray, 4 F.3d 1285, 1292 (4th Cir. 1993).
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conversation during a chance encounter on a Richmond street between
Mr. Zerkin and an attorney for the government resulted in an agreement
that DNA tests (which had by now become available) should be
performed on samples recovered from the vaginal vault of the victim."
At this point, Barry C. Scheck and Peter Neufeld volunteered their DNA
expertise, and Barry Weinstein of the Virginia Resource Center joined
the legal team to help in compiling a pardon petition to Governor L.
Douglas Wilder.
That petition, filed on December 20, 1993, 4 included the DNA test
results as reported by the Virginia Division of Forensic Science." For
the single genetic marker examined, Mr. Washington had DNA type 1.2,
4; Ms. and Clifford Williams were both of DNA type 4,4; the DNA type
of the sperm found in Ms. Williams body was 1.1, 1.2, 4.8" Thus, the
testing showed that the sperm contained a genetic characteristic (a 1.1
allele) that could not belong to any of these individuals. 7
It was the view of Mr. Washington's counsel-one that the
Attorney General initially shared's-that at this point there was simply
no case remaining against Mr. Washington. 9 Counsel accordingly urged
Governor Wilder to recognize his innocence through the grant of a full
pardon. 9° But the Governor refused to do so. Instead, on January 14,
1994, hours before the expiration of his term, he commuted Mr.
Washington's sentence to life imprisonment with the right of parole.'
83. Previous attempts to type that material, using conventional serology testing, had failed
because there was no method for separating out the male contribution to the vaginal mixture, which
contained a significant amount of the victim's own blood.
84. See 1993 Pardon Petition, supranote 8.
85. See DIVISION OF FORENSIC SCIENCE, COMMONWEALTH OF VA., CERTIFICATIE OF
ANALYSIS (Oct. 25, 1993).
86. See id.
87. In the words of the Virginia report, "[neither Earl Washington (HLA DQa Type 1.2, 4),
Rebecca Williams (HLA DQa Type 4,4), nor Clifford Williams (HLA DQa Type 4,4), individually
or in combination, can be the contributor(s) of the 1.1 allele previously detected on the vaginal
swab." Id.
88. See Letter from Robert T. Hall, Defense Counsel, to Walter S. Felton, Jr., Counselor to
the Governor and Director of Policy 7 (Feb. 25, 2000) [hereinafter Hall Letter).
89. That view was shared by a scientist acknowledged to be one of the world's leading
authorities in the field, Dr. Henry A. Erlich. Acting pro bono, Dr. Erlich tested samples from Earl
Washington, the victim, and her husband using highly advanced DNA analysis. See Letter from
Henry A. Erlich, Ph.D., Director, Human Genetics, to Barry Weinstein, Defense Counsel 2 (Jan. 13,
1994) [hereinafter Erlich Letter]. He concluded that the presence of a unique 1.1 allele "cast[s] very
significant doubt about Mr. Washington's contribution to the sample." Id.
90. See 1993 Pardon Petition, supra note 8, at 1-2.
91. See Governor Lawrence Douglas Wilder, Conditional Pardon of Earl Washington, Jr., at 4
(Jan. 14, 1994) [hereinafter Conditional Pardon]; Death Sentence Is Coninuted, N.Y. TIMES, Jan,
16, 1994, at 16. Governor Wilder noted that "there are no provisions under Virginia law whereby

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol29/iss4/4

12

Freedman: Earl Washington's Ordeal
20011

EARL WASHINGTONS ORDE4L

In the aftermath of this "political half-loaf'92 various government
officials advanced imaginative theories to justify Governor Wilder's
failure to release Mr. Washington. For instance, if some hithertounmentioned person (one with a 1.1 allele) had joined with Mr.
Washington in raping Ms. Williams, then this might provide an
explanation for the test results.93 That hypothesis, however, was entirely
inconsistent with the known facts. Not only did the Commonwealth's
case at trial rest on Mr. Washington's "confession," which made no
mention of any such third person, but, as recounted above, Ms. Williams
stated specifically to two people (her husband and a police officer) that
she had been raped by only one man.
Moreover, this scenario was as implausible scientifically as it was
forensically. The 4 allele found by the testing was probably a result of an
incomplete separation of the male and female contributions to the
mixture, and thus a contamination from the victim's own genetic
material.9 In that case, the true genotype of the sperm would be 1.1, 1.2.
If so, Mr. Washington could not possibly have been involved-the
sample would not only contain a 1.1 allele (which concededly could not
be his), but would also fail to contain a 4 allele (which it would
necessarily need to contain if he were the donor).
But Mr. Washington had no judicial avenue by which to press his
claims. The time limit in Virginia for the reopening of a criminal case on
the basis of newly discovered evidence was (and is) twenty-one days,7
[the] newly discovered [DNA] evidence can now be considered by the courts." Conditional Pardon.
supraat 1; see infra note 95 and accompanying text for discussion of Virginia's 21.day rule.
It is a plausible speculation that wilder's decision was influenced by his contemplation of
a run for the U.S. Senate. Although there had been rumors of such a campaign throughout the
previous fall, Wilder announced he would not run three days before leaving office (and commuting
Earl Washington's sentence). By March of 1994. however. Wilder was publicly reconsidering his
decision not to run, and officially announced his candidacy in June. He later withdrew. See
Margaret Edds & Warren Fiske, "I Will FightNo More Forever": Wilder Bails Out of Senate Race
After 2 PollsShwwed Him Trailing Badly, VIRGiNIAN-PILOT (Norfolk). Sept. 16. 1994. at Al.
92. Eric M. Freedman, Letter to the Editor, In Virginia, Innocent Man Stays in Prison. N.Y.
TiEs, Jan. 28, 1994, at A26.
93. See Hall Letter, supra note 88. at 6 n.7 ("The theory would be that this mysterious
stranger contributed the 1.1 allele, and the remaining alleles, 1.2 and 4, belonged to Mr.
Washington.").
94. See Erlich Letter, supra note 99, at 1-2; Hall Letter, supra note 88. at 7.
95. See VA. CODE ANN. 19.2-264.6 (Michie 2000). Although this limit is the shortest in the
country, the problem is a general one. Only two states (New York and Illinois) spzecifically
recognize re-opening on the basis of DNA evidence, and, significantly, those tvo states have the
highest number of exonerations. See JIM DvYER, PEtER NEUFELD & BARRY Sciti:O,: ACTUAL
INNoCENcE: FIvE DAYS TO EXECUIrON AND OThER DIsPT.sxcs FROM TlII WRONGLY CONVICED
246-47 (2000). On May 2, 2001, in part as a result of the lessons learned from the NNa'hington
affair, Governor Gilmore signed into law S.B. 1366, which requires the preservation of biological
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and the prospects in federal court were less than favorable."' Thus,

despite one abortive effort to gain him legislative relief,'

Mr.

Washington languished in prison.

After many painful years, Mr. Scheck was able to inform the rest of
the legal team that advances in DNA technology might be able to unlock

the door to Mr. Washington's cell.9" The invention of the Short Tandem
Repeater (STR) test, which sampled many more genetic markers than
the single marker tested in 1993, could lay to rest all scenarios, no matter

how fanciful, that implicated Mr. Washington.
But without a judicial avenue available, the only recourse was to
the governor. Accordingly, beginning in early 2000, counsel requested
Governor James S. Gilmore, III to order additional testing.' Since the
governor was not legally obligated to act, and had political reasons to

avoid doing so for as long as possible, months went by with no reply,
until eventually the Virginia press began demanding to know why.'o In
May, Peter Neufeld, Bob Hall and Jerry Zerkin met with Gilmore's
counsel. Neufeld explained the new science and communicated that
without a legal remedy, Mr. Washington's only avenue for obtaining
evidence and authorizes convicted felons to seek DNA testing. See, e.g., Death Penalty Information
Center,
Changes
in
the
Death
Around
Penalty
the
U.S.,
at
http:lwww.deathpenaltyinfo.org/Changes.html (last visited May 27, 2001); Justice is Served by
Virginia's New DNA Rule, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk), May 8, 2001, at B8; Virginians for
Alternatives to the Death Penalty, Summary: Death Penalty Bills in the 2001 General Assembly, at
http://www.vadp.orglegis.htm (last visited May 27, 2001). The statute is, however, so limited that
its practical effect is likely to be small.
96. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993) (stating that "[claims of actual
innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground for federal
habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation").
97. See Capital Case Bill of Review, H.B. 213, 1994 Sess., Gen. Assem. (Va. 1994). The
bill-passed by the House almost immediately but shelved indefinitely by the Senate Committee for
Courts of Justice-was intended to amend the Virginia Code by allowing for the re-opening of a
death penalty case upon the discovery of new evidence. See id.; see supra note 95 and
accompanying text for current developments in Virginia law.
98. See Hall Letter, supranote 88, at 7.
99. See, e.g., Hall Letter, supra note 88, at 7-8; Letter from Gerald T. Zerkin, Defense
Counsel, to Walter S. Felton, Jr., Counsel to the Governor and Director of Policy (Jan. 27, 2000).
100. See, e.g., Editorial, Earl Washington: Set Him Free, DNA Tests Point to Itnocence,
VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk), Feb. 15, 2000, at BI0; Margaret Edds, Wrongly Accused and
Sentenced: Freeing Washington Would Destroy Myth of Justice, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk), Apr.
16, 2000, at J5; Frank Green, Gilmore Won't Rush Decision on DNA Test, RICHMOND TIMESDISPATCH, May 3, 2000, at Al. By this time, Mr. Washington's case had also benefited from a
broadcast of the PBS show Frontline. See Frontline: The Case for Innocence (PBS television
broadcast, Jan. 11, 2000), transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pagcs/frontline (last
visited May 27, 2001). This revealed, among other things, that the semen stain had been subjected
to DNA testing by the government in late 1993 or early 1994, and that the exculpatory results were
not shared with defense counsel. See id.; DIVISION OF FORENSIC SCIENCE, COMMONWEALTH OF
VA., CERTIFICATE OF ANALYSIS (Jan. 14, 1994).
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gubernatorial action was through the press. On June 1, 2000, the
governor announced that he was ordering the testing.01 His
spokeswoman said it should be completed in a few weeks. 1QWith no
results received after three months, the national press intensified its
coverage.' 3 Counsel filed a pardon petition on September 7.' On
October 2, 2000, the governor announced that he was issuing a full
pardon on the capital charges.'"5 Of critical importance to Mr.
Washington's proof of innocence, not only did the new round of DNA
testing completely eliminate him as a contributor to either the vaginal
swab or the blanket stains, but it also identified the source of semen on
the blanket. The state compared the DNA profile from the blanket to the
Virginia DNA database of convicted offenders and obtained a match to a
prisoner serving time for rape who had been at liberty at the time of the
Williams murder."''

However, notwithstanding counsel's request, the governor took no
action to commute the non-capital sentence for the burglary and
malicious wounding of Hazel Weeks, even though Mr. Washington
would have been paroled on those charges long before if he had not been
wrongly convicted of the capital charges.'" As a result, Mr. Washington
remained in prison until his mandatory release date of February 12,
2001.'

101. See Press Release, Statement of Governor Gilmore Regarding Earl \Vashington (June 1.
2000); Brooke A. Masters, Gilmore Orders DNA Testing for Man Imprisoned Since '83. WASH.
POST, June 2,2000, at Al.
102. See Masters,supranote 101.
103. See Francis X. Clines, New DNA Tests Are Seen As Key to irginia Case. N.Y. TP-IES
Sept. 7, 2000, at A18; Masters, supra note 101; see also Earl Washington: 77.e Leng Wat: D*YA
Test Results Are Overdue, ViRItAN-PinoT (Norfolk). Aug. 12. 2000. at B6.
104. See Letter from Gerald T. Zerkin. Defense Counsel, to Gov. Jar es S. Gilmore, I11,
Governor of Virginia (Sept. 6, 2000) (accompanying Earl Washington. Jr.: Finally Releasing an
InnocentMan, Petition for Executive Pardon (Sept. 7,2000) [hereinafter 2000 Pardon Petition]).
105. See Gilmore, supra note 47, at 2; see also Nightline: Man Pardonedfor Rape and Murder
Remains Imprisoned (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 6.2000).
106. See Gilmore, supra note 47, at 2.
107. See 2000 Pardon Petition, supra note 104, at 6 (setting forth sentencing data shov'ing that
Mr. Washington would probably have been paroled in 1994. after serving ten to eleven years in
prison).
108. See Jim Dwyer, Virginia GovAdds Insult to Idiocy, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.). Feb. 11. 2001, at
8; McGlone, supra note 1. He had been scheduled to travel to NWashington that day to confer with
legislators seeking to mitigate the problems of %,,ongfulcapital convictions, but the Virginia parole
authorities blocked that trip. See Dwyer, supra: see also Tim MeGlone, Sa oring His Freedom: Off
Death Row and Into the Sunshine, Earl Washington, Jr. Builds a NeAw Life, VtRGIL,%rL-PiLOT
(Norfolk), Aug. 12,2001, at Al.
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II. THE LESSONS
Lest this Preface pre-empt the substance of the Symposium it
introduces, I present in very compressed form the salient systemic flaws
that I believe Mr. Washington's story highlights.
A.

Race

The impact of race on the criminal justice system generally, and the
capital punishment system in particular, has been extensively
documented.' 9 Mr. Washington's case certainly raises the possibility
that there may be aspects of the problem which are inherent in our
culture and will defy capture by statistics, no matter how sophisticated.
What led the initial investigators down the path that they must be
dealing with a sex crime? In light of Mrs. Weeks' later testimony, they
could not have had any solid basis for believing so; yet they extracted
from Mr. Washington a "confession" to attempted rape, and then to a
series of sex crimes."0 Would they have done so if he had not been black
and the victim white? There is no way to know, but the question
certainly lingers.
B. False Confessions
This problem, too, has received extensive study."' What Mr.
Washington's case brings home is the reality that the police need not
necessarily be malicious;" 2 sloppiness will do. If the police believe that
resistance from their interlocutor is simply an attempt to impede them
from verifying what they "know" to be the facts, they will apply
pressure that generates accounts whose content comes from the officers

109. See, e.g., Harris Brief, supra note 3, at 62-70 (canvassing studies demonstrating that
"[r]ace discrimination is both the most detectable symptom and the most invidious consequence of
the unamenability of life-and-death sentencing choices to rational regulation. It has persisted
unchecked under every form of post-Furman capital sentencing procedure."); see also DWYER,
NEUFELD & SCHECK, supranote 95, at 193-210, 279-80 (including resource list),
110. See supratext accompanying notes 11-42.
I11. See, e.g., DWYER, NEUFELD & SCHECK, supra note 95, at 78-107, 271-72 (including
resource list).
112. In arguing Earl Washington's case to the Fourth Circuit, I explicitly disclaimed any
attempt to show that the police had been trying to "railroad" him. See Frank Green, Lawyers Say
Confession Details May Have Been Offered by Police, RICHMOND TIMES-DMSPATCH, June 5, 1990,
at B8.
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rather than the suspect." 3 This is inconsistent with an unbiased search for
the truth, and is likely to impede arriving at that goal.'
C. Mental Retardation

Of course, those problems are exacerbated when the suspect is
mentally retarded."' First, mentally retarded people are likely to be

skillful at concealing their condition, so that interrogators may not even
know caution is in order."6 Second, mentally retarded people suffer from
severe disadvantages in an interrogation setting. They tend to be
suggestible, in part because this furthers a coping strategy of concealing
their limitations and in part because their experience suggests that others
are more likely to be right than they are."7 Moreover, diminished

cognitive capacity means that the retarded have less ability than other
people to understand both the contents and the potentially incriminating
implications of any questions they may be asked."'

There is little doubt that these factors were at work in Mr.
Washington's case. He is an amiable, gentle person who tries hard to
please others." 9 Hence, when told the "correct" answer to a question, he
113. See Jurek v. Estelle, 623 F.2d 929, 950-51. 951 n.23 (5th Cir. 19.0) lJohnxon. J,
concurring) (noting the perils of this process, especially ith "highly suggestible" suspects).
114. This is not an isolated problem. In twenty-three percent of the DNA exonerations to date,
the prisoner had made a false confession or admission. See DWYER. NEUrELD & SCaECK, supra
note 95, at 92. Scheck and his co-authors note that sixty-three percent of the DNA exonzrations
analyzed by the Innocence Project involved significant police or proseutorial misconduct. vhich
courts often dismiss as "harmless error" and tolerate because law enforcement officers are seen as
seeking a "greater good." See id. at 175, 179-80.
115. See, e.g., THE CRIMINAL JusTicE SYSTEM AND MENTAL RETARD.ATION: DEFED.ANTS

AND VICIMS (Ronald NV.Conley et al. eds., 1992) (presenting articles by criminal justice expcrts
on the challenges posed by the mentally retarded); Death Penalty Information Center, Mental
Retardation and the Death Penalty, at http/www.deathpenaltyinfo.org(dpicmr.html (last visited
May 27,2001) (compiling statistics, cases, and news stories on the subject).
116. See James NV. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defcndants, 53
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 414, 458 (1985) ('[Elfforts that many mentally retarded people typically
expend in trying to prevent any discovery of their handicap may render the existence or the
magnitude of their disability invisible to criminal justice system personnel."); Luckasson, supra
note 51, at 4-5.
117. See Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 116, at 451 (citing PRESIDE'"S PANEL ON METAL
REARDATION, REPORT OFTHE TASK FORCE ON LAW 33 (1963)); Luckasson. supranote 5!, at4.
118. See Jurek, 623 F.2d at 937 (questioning the voluntariness of a confession of a mantally
retarded person where there is an "inability to comprehend the circumstances"). Ellis & Luckass-on.
supra note 116, at 451; Bob Herbert, The Confession, N.Y. TmIEs, June 21, 2001. at A25
(describing the Washington case and noting that "[c]ven when mentally retarded defendants are
clearly guilty, it is extremely difficult to determine their level of culpability").
119. In the words of John N. Follansbee, M.D., who examined Mr. Washington at the request
of defense counsel, "It was my impression that if on the evening of his execution th: electric chair
were to fail to function, he would agree to assist in its repair." 1 Joint Appcndix, supra note 5. at
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will repeat it on a subsequent occasion, regardless of whether he
understands it.'20 His "confessions" reflect these characteristics. 2 '
D. Ineffective Counsel
Had Mr. Washington been competently represented, he would have

been acquitted at trial. But he was not." This problem is endemic to the
capital punishment system." It is starkly pointed out in this case by the

fact that Mr. Washington was competently represented on the noncapital cases: He pleaded guilty to those offenses of which he was guilty,
and the charges of which he was innocent were dropped. 2 4
The single most meaningful reform of the capital punishment
system, short of its abolition, would be the provision of effective trial
counsel, through a system that provided adequate compensation, expert
resources, and the training and support needed to practice in this esoteric
field.'5 If that happened-and nowhere has it to date' 2 --there would be
134-35 (Declaration of John N. Follansbee, M.D.); see also Luckasson, supra note 51, at 4 (noting
that people in Earl's hometown described him as "very goodhearted," "a good boy," and "wanting
to please others").
120. See Saunders Declaration, supra note 50, at 153; Luckasson, supra note 51 at 7 ("All the
circumstances surrounding the 'confession' indicate that its contents came (intentionally or not)
from the police and were simply parroted back by Earl, piece by piece as he learned it.").
121. According to Professor Luckasson's report, during the interrogations in all five eases Earl
"attempted to save face by using his coping strategy of seeming to understand, and he was taking as
many cues as he could from [the officers'] behavior and words to try to 'get it right' ... [Hie
believed they 'knew' the facts so he was trying to guess until his guesses matched what they
'knew."' Luckasson, supra note 51, at 7.
122. See supratext accompanying notes 46-63.
123. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Counselfor the Poor: The Death Sentence Notfor the Worst
Crime butfor the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE LJ. 1835, 1836 (1994); Gary Goodpaster, The Trialfor
Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 302-03
(1983); Ira P. Robbins, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty
Cases, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 62-92 (1990).
124. See supratext accompanying notes 13-25.
125. See James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. RttV. 2030, 2147
(2000).
126. Chapter 154 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1221-26 (1996) (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2253-55 and adding
§§ 2261-66), provides a number of procedural advantages to states that furnish adequate counsel to
capital prisoners. See 28 U.S.C. § 2265 (Supp. IV 1999). But no state has yet been held to qualify
under Chapter 154. See Spears v. Stewart, No. 01-99000, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 20850, at *39 (9th
Cir. Sept. 24, 2001) (Arizona does not qualify under Chapter 154); Kreutzer v. Bowersox, 231 F.3d
460, 462-63 (8th Cir. 2000) (Missouri does not qualify under Chapter 154), cert. denied, No. 0010520, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 6178 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2001); Tucker v. Catoe, 221 F.3d 600, 605 (4th Cir.)
(South Carolina does not qualify under Chapter 154), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1054 (2000); Ashmus
v.Woodford, 202 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir.) (California does not qualify under Chapter 154), cert.
denied, 121 S.Ct. 274 (2000); Baker v. Corcoran, 220 F.3d 276, 285-87 (4th Cir. 2000) (Maryland
does not qualify under Chapter 154), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 1194 (2001); Smith v. Anderson, 104
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far fewer convictions and death sentences, but those few would be much
more likely to stick. That is an outcome that would be in the best

interests of all concerned. When the government attempts to evade costs
at the front end, they emerge at the back end-not just in the monetary

drain of lengthy appeals, but in such injustices as the irreplaceable years
that Earl Washington spent wrongfully imprisoned.
E. InadequatePostconvictionReview
Having adjudicated guilt and decided upon execution under

conditions that are troubling, to say the least, the system thereupon
indulges every presumption in favor of the trial outcome. This
ostrich-like phenomenon, which is certainly apparent in the judicial

performance in Mr. Washington's case,'" has hardly been improved
since then by enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996,' whose provisions were specifically designed to
reduce the number of successful federal habeas corpus petiions.'"

Substantively, moreover, both state and federal judicial systems remain
hostile to claims of actual innocence."'
F. Politics

As a result, the decisions about guilt or innocence (e.g., whether to
order DNA testing to be performed, what action to take on the results)
are almost always in the hands of Governors (or Presidents) or their
designees. And, as Mr. Washington's case certainly illustrates, those
F. Supp. 2d 773, 786 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (Ohio does not qualify under Chapter 154); King v.
Netherland, No. 96-0641-R, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11678, at *17 (W.D. Va. Aug. 4. 1997)
(Virginia does not qualify under Chapter 154); qf'd sub. norn. King v. Greene. 141 F.3d 1158 (4th
Cir. 1998); Ward v. French, 989 F. Supp. 752, 757 (E.D.N.C. 1997) (North Carolina daez not
qualify under Chapter 154), aff'd, 165 F.3d 22 (4th Cir. 1998); Loekett v. Pueketto 920 F. Supp. 201.
210 n.1 1 (S.D. Miss. 1997) (Mississippi does not qualify under Chapter 154): Williams %P.
Cain. 942
F. Supp. 1088, 1092 (W.D. La. 1996) (Louisiana does not qualify under Chapter 154).
127. See supratext accompanying notes 63-82.
128. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-66 (Supp. IV 1999).
129. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REc. S3352, S3353 (daily ed. Apr. 16. 1996) (remarks of Sen. Orrin
Hatch) (noting that the proposed habeas reform would "end the ability of ... heinous ... %iolent
criminals ... to delay the imposition of their sentence"); 142 CONG. REc. H3605, H3606 Idaily ed.
Apr. 18, 1996) (remarks of Rep. Henry Hyde) (calling habeas corpus reform "the Holy Grail" and
stating that there is "[n]othing wrong" with a "I-year statute of limitations in habeas"); H.R. CONE.
REP. No. 104-518, at 111 (1995), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 944 (noting that tide incor"rates
reforms to "curb the abuse of the statutory writ of habeas corpus").
130. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,399-400 (1993) (holding that a claim of actual
innocence alone does not entitle petitioner to habeas relief); Harris Brief, supra note 3, at 76-77,77
n.177 (noting that government officials "have a strong resistance to acknonledging the exonerative
significance" of subsequently discovered evidence).
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officials are political ones, who act in response to political concerns.

There is nothing wrong with politics affecting the decisions of the
political branches, but there is sound reason why the political branches
are not entrusted with determinations of guilt or innocence.

Meaningful reform will require that prisoners claiming innocence
have meaningful access to the judicial branch. And meaningful access

must mean access without time limits, on the basis of realistic
substantive standards, and with the assistance of counsel and experts. 3'

Earl Washington could not have made on his own behalf the written and
oral presentations that were required to persuade Governors Wilder and
Gilmore to conduct DNA testing, and would have been equally
incapable of making the same case to a court; thus, granting him the
right to do so without also providing the necessary resources would be
simple mockery.
More generally, the availability of DNA testing should be taken as

an alarm siren alerting us to the dangerous flaws in our criminal justice
system. Testable DNA samples exist in only a small fraction of cases,'32

and wrongful convictions have many other causes-including inaccurate
eyewitness identification,'33 the unreliable testimony of prison
informants,' 34 and false confessions. If Mr. Washington had been
accused of a shooting rather than a rape-murder, there would have been
no DNA. That would have left him just as innocent, but dead by the
hand of the state. The availability of DNA in some cases acts as a check
on the system in much the same way that a tax audit does. The results so
far certainly indicate cause for 37concern,'36 and every effort at legislative
amelioration deserves support.1
131. See DWYER, NEUFELD & SCHECK, supra note 95, app. 1 at 255-60 (setting forth "A Short
List of Reforms to Protect the Innocent"); Liebman, supra note 125, at 2144-50 (proposing
significant reform efforts to combat the problem of excessive pursuit of death sentences).
132. See DWYER, NEUFELD & SCHECK, supra note 95, at xv (noting that most crimes do not
involve biological evidence).
133. See id. at xvi, 41-77 ("Eyewitness error remains the single most important cause of
wrongful imprisonment.").
134. See, e.g., Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778, 783-84 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000) (canvassing the
unreliable nature of prison informants' testimony and imposing specific procedures for its use); see
also DWYER, NEUFELD & SCHECK, supra note 95, at 126-57.
135. See supra Part II.B;
see also DWYER, NEUFELD & SCHECK, supra note 95, at 92.
136. DNA evidence has "provided stone-cold proof that sixty-seven people were sent to prison
and death row for crimes they did not commit." DWYER, NEUFELD & SCHECK, snpra note 95, at
xiv. DNA evidence was a substantial factor in establishing the innocence of ten of the ninety-four
inmates released from death row since 1973. See Death Penalty Information Center, Innocence:
Freed from Death Row, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/Innocentlist.html (last visited May 27,
2001).
137. See, e.g., Innocence Protection Act of 2001, S. 486, 107th Cong. (2001), reprinted in 29
HOFSTRA L. REv. 1113 (2001).
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Ultimately, however, no human system is perfect. Perhaps that
growing realization-combined with the reality that the death penalty
does not have a deterrent effect' but rather diverts resources from
measures that would in fact reduce the crime rate--vill lead in the
near future to a societal reassessment of the costs and benefits of
retaining the death penalty system.
Or perhaps progress will come less from an exercise in abstraction

than one in imagination: Any one of us could wind up in Earl
Washington's position, and what then?

138. See Harris Brief, supranote 3, at 101-07 (pointing out that no reputable study to date has
found evidence to support the theory of deterrence as a result of the death p:nalty); Robert Sh-rrill,
Death Trip: The American Way of Execution, NATION, Jan. 8-15, 2001, at 13, 18 (noting that the
number of murders in Florida more than doubled after institution of the death p-enalty in 1979).
139. See Eric M. Freedman, The Case Against the Death Penalty, USA TOi)AY, Mar. 1997
(Magazine), at 48, 49.
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APPENDIX
EARL WASHINGTON'S ORDEAL: TIMELINE

140

June 4, 1982: Rebecca Lynn Williams, a nineteen year-old mother
of three, is raped and murdered in her Culpeper, Virginia, apartment.
May 21, 1983: Earl Washington is arrested in Warrenton, Virginia,
in Fauquier County, on an unrelated case-burglary and malicious
wounding. During two days of questioning by law enforcement officials
from the Virginia State Police, Culpeper County, and Fauquier County,
he confesses to four other crimes including the Williams murder.
Nov. 2, 1983: Trial Judge F. Ward Harkrader, Jr. rules that
Washington's confession was voluntary and could be used against him
at trial.
Jan. 18-20, 1984: Washington's trial (guilt and penalty phases),
results injury's decision to convict and impose death penalty.
March 12, 1984: Sentencing hearing and imposition of the death
penalty by Trial Judge David F. Berry.
March 20, 1984: In its written order imposing the death penalty,
trial court sets execution date of July 27, 1984. Execution date
subsequently stayed by the Virginia Supreme Court pending appeal.
May 1, 1984: Washington pleads guilty to burglary and malicious
wounding and is sentenced to two fifteen-year sentences (thirty years) to
run consecutively.
May 9, 1984: Washington is sent to Virginia's death row at
Mecklenburg Correctional Center.
Nov. 30, 1984: Virginia Supreme Court affirms capital conviction
and sentence of death.
May 13, 1985: U.S. Supreme Court denies review.
July 3, 1985: Trial court sets execution date of September 5, 1985,
and denies motion by trial counsel for appointment of state habeas
counsel.
Aug. 16, 1985: Washington is transferred to the execution site,
Virginia State Penitentiary in Richmond, and hears electric chair being
tested.
Aug. 19, 1985: Joseph Giarratano, a fellow death-row inmate, and
Marie Deans, director of the Virginia Coalition on Jails and Prisons,
describe Earl's plight to Martha Geer, who is at the prison on a different
140. This document is the work of Barry Weinstein. I have edited it slightly for publication.
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case. She persuades her firm, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison
of New York City, to represent Washington pro bono.
Aug. 27, 1985: A team of lawyers from Paul, Weiss, spearheaded
by Eric M. Freedman, files state habeas petition and application for stay
of execution. Stay application is granted by Judge Lloyd C. Sullenberger
nine days before scheduled execution. Washington returns to Virginia's
death row at Mecklenburg Correctional Center. Robert T. Hall enters
case.

Dec. 23, 1986: State trial court denies state habeas petition without
an evidentiary hearing.
Feb. 26, 1988: Virginia Supreme Court denies petition for appeal.
July 28, 1988: Federal habeas petition filed in Eastern District of
Virginia.
Oct. 25, 1989: U.S. District Judge Claude M. Hilton denies petition
for federal habeas corpus relief without an evidentiary hearing. Appeal
filed.
Dec. 19, 1991: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
remands case back to the U.S. District Court for an evidentiary hearing
on issue of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate and
introduce exculpatory semen stains found on blanket where crime took
place.
April 6, 1992: Gerald T. Zerkin enters case. District court conducts
evidentiary hearing.
July 29, 1992: Judge Hilton once again denies petition for federal
habeas corpus relief.
Sept. 17, 1993: Fourth Circuit, by a 2-1 vote, affirms district court
ruling.
Oct. 8, 1993: Fourth Circuit, by a 2-1 vote, denies petition for
rehearing. Lawyers anticipate imminent execution date.
Oct. 25, 1993: A DNA test done by Virginia Division of Forensic
Science on biological evidence reveals a genetic marker that could not
have come from Washington. But Virginia's 21-day rule prohibits a
return to court for relief on the grounds of newly discovered evidence.
Barry A. Weinstein, Barry C. Scheck, and Peter Neufeld enter case.
Dec. 20, 1993: Washington files petition for pardon vith Governor
L. Douglas Wilder.
Jan. 14, 1994: Hours before the expiration of his term on January
15, Governor Wilder commutes Washington's sentence of death to life
imprisonment with possibility of parole.
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Jan., 2000: Washington requests that Governor James Gilmore, III
conduct further DNA testing on the biological material previously tested
by the Virginia Bureau of Forensic Science.
June 1, 2000: Under press pressure, Governor Gilmore grants
request and orders additional DNA testing.
Sept. 7, 2000: Still without test results, Washington files pardon
petition with the governor.
Oct. 2, 2000: Governor Gilmore grants an absolute pardon to
Washington as to the capital murder conviction but refuses to consider
unrelated burglary and malicious wounding convictions. Virginia
Department of Corrections subsequently determines that Washington
would have been eligible for parole consideration on January 25, 1989,
on those charges and that his mandatory release date is February 12,
2001.
Dec. 22, 2000: Virginia Parole Board denies discretionary parole
release.
Feb. 12, 2001: Washington is released from prison to parole
supervision.
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